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Abstract
In 685, at a pivotal juncture in her ascendancy, empress dowager-regent Wu Zhao,
with help from her extra-bureaucratic aides, the Scholars of the Northern Gate,
created a political manual for court officials, Regulations for Ministers (Chen Gui 臣
軌). Recognizing the anomalous nature of her political authority, Wu Zhao and her
co-authors rooted this signature work in Chinese tradition. She borrowed ideas from
a work written by her first husband and predecessor, Tang Taizong 太宗 (r. 626-49),
Plan For an Emperor (Di fan 帝範), like the metaphor that ruler and officials were
part of a shared, interdependent “common body.” In addition, Regulations drew
heavily upon the twin pillars of Confucianism, filial piety and loyalty, in a rhetorical
manner that promoted greater loyalty to the ruler (herself ). However, her adroit use
of tradition was a ploy to subvert tradition. Due to her gender, Regulations stretched
conventions to accommodate her political agenda––to become emperor––which
subverted the unspoken rule that barred women from claiming the crown. In this
respect and others, like timing and target audience, Wu Zhao’s Regulations, although
borrowing from cultural norms, stands independent from prior texts like Taizong’s
Plan for an Emperor.
Introduction
Among the diverse strategies employed to augment her political authority, China’s
first and only female emperor Wu Zhao 武曌 (624-705, r. 690-705) concealed
her innovative ideas in the guise of tradition. As Empress (655-683) and Grand
Dowager (684-690), she went to great lengths to superficially present herself in the
image of a dutiful housewife, a doting mother, and a scrupulously loyal follower of
Confucian tenets. Through her cunning, the parameters of these personas expanded,
permitting Wu Zhao to gain entry into an otherwise exclusive patriarchal world. In
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665, while Gaozong’s 高宗 (r. 649-83) empress, in an early display of her capacity
to manipulate tradition, Wu Zhao skillfully used Confucian rhetoric to argue her
way into participating in the Shan rite 禪––part of the Feng and Shan sacrifices 封
禪, grand and sacrosanct ceremonies performed to secure tranquility between earth
below, heaven above, and the ruler––previously a solely male event. In the Shan
sacrifice, she performed the secondary sacrifices and replaced imperial court officials
with noblewomen. Including women in this event yielded a wider circle of female
visibility in the public sphere––an occurrence that repeatedly transpired throughout
Wu Zhao’s acquisition of power.1
During the latter half of Gaozong’s reign, the Tang dynasty faced a series of
disasters. First, Gaozong, who struggled with health complications throughout his
rule, suffered a stroke in 660.2 While his ailing health marked an obvious strain on
the empire, Wu Zhao used his weakened position to augment her own authority. In
that same year, Wu Zhao assumed the role of co-ruler over China’s vast empire and
became one of the “Two Sages”––a distinction that further allowed the empress to
play a conspicuous and active role in government.3 Second, in 666, the government
debased the currency to solve the ever-escalating expenses of the Korean
campaign––an act that spurred economic failure.4 The Tang empire’s already dire
situation spiraled in 668, 669, and 670 when famine and natural disasters struck
the empire.5 Coupled with these catastrophes, the deaths of Wu Zhao’s mother, a
useful ally in court due to her influential political connections, and chief minister
Xu Jingzong 許敬宗 (d. 672), who helped actuate Wu Zhao’s political supremacy,
challenged her fragile position in court.6 Despite these setbacks, the deaths of heirs
apparent in 675 and 680 removed a major obstacle standing in the way of Wu Zhao
and the throne. Written in the wake of Gaozong’s death in 683, her political treatise,
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 hen Jo-Shui, “Empress Wu and Proto-Feminist Sentiments in T’ang China,” Imperial Rulership
C
and Cultural Change in Traditional China, ed. Frederick Brandauer and Chun-Chieh Huang
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1995), 84.
N. Harry Rothschild, Emperor Wu Zhao and her Pantheon of Devis, Divinities, and Dynastic Mother
(New York: Colombia University Press, 2015), 50.
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The Inheritor and the Usurper,” The Cambridge History of China (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 1979), 266-267.
Twitchett and Weschler, “Kao-Tsung (Reign 649-83) and the Empress Wu,” 267.
Ibid.
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Regulations for Ministers (Chen Gui 臣軌; hereafter Regulations) served to amplify
and legitimize her political power first as grand dowager, and later as emperor.
Her predecessor (and first husband) Taizong 太宗 (r. 626-49) crafted a similar
text on governance, titled Plan for an Emperor (Di fan 帝範; hereafter Plan) to
provide instruction to his son, Gaozong. Plan emerged near the conclusion of
Taizong’s grand if checkered reign marked by military failures, an estranged inner
court, and his waning health. As disease ravaged his body, Taizong focused on the
future, mending fissures within the court; to this end, he rooted his imperial guide
for Gaozong, his Plan, in Confucian tradition.7
In Regulations, Wu Zhao drew upon concepts presented in Taizong’s Plan, such as
the “common body” (tongti 同體) metaphor and a structural analogy to explain the
minster-ruler binary. Contrary to what the scholars Richard Guisso and Li Hexian
believe, Wu Zhao did not model Regulations after Taizong’s work.8 Although pulling
from similar conventions as the earlier text, the audience, timing, and intention
behind Wu Zhao’s work set Regulations apart. While Regulations is reminiscent in
some respects to Plan, sections within it like “Absolute Loyalty” (zhi zhong 至忠),
and “Good Generals” (liang jiang 良將), allowed her ideas on the ruler-minister
binary to toe the line of tradition while simultaneously carving out a new and
ingenious path that led her to the seat of paramount power––emperor.
The Respective Intentions Behind Plan for an Emperor and Regulations for
Ministers
Mark Lewis characterizes Wu Zhao’s “think tank,” the Scholars of the Northern Gate
(Beimen xueshi 北門學士), as a “sinister” or “secret” secretariat that existed outside
of the bureaucracy yet participated in government actions.9 In 685, while Wu Zhao
scrambled to consolidate her control over the court as Grand Dowager, this group of
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 enis Twitchett, “How to be an Emperor: T’ang T’ai-tsung’s Vision of His Role,” Asia Major 9,
D
no. 1-2, (1996): 92.
N. Harry Rothschild, “Rhetoric, Ritual, and Support Constituencies in the Political Authority of
Wu Zhao, Woman Emperor of China,” (PhD diss., Brown University, 2003), 144.
Mark E. Lewis, China’s Cosmopolitan Empire: The Tang Dynasty (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2009), 38. In fact, other Tang emperors worked with similar extra-bureaucratic
groups; Xuanzong 玄宗 (r. 712-56), Wu Zhao’s grandson, set up the famous Forest of Brushes
(Hanlin 翰林院) Academy.
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scholars helped produce Regulations for Ministers.10 Neither Wu Zhao nor her aides
desired to deviate from tradition, instead they chose to reinterpret these old texts
in the hope of vaulting Wu Zhao onto the throne.11 Therefore, Regulations blended
various Confucian, Daoist, and Legal texts along with thirty-five other works into its
prose.12 The amalgamation of various Chinese traditions provided Wu Zhao the guise
she needed to issue her political ideas to her wide audience––the court ministers.
Using tradition to conceal personal ambition or an illegitimate seizure of power
was not unprecedented. In 626, nearly sixty years prior to the creation of Regulations,
Taizong seized the title of heir apparent by force and, shortly after, procured the
title of emperor. After seizing the throne, Taizong sent his father, Gaozu 高祖 (r.
618-26), the retired emperor, to live in a cramped castle in the western part of the
city, forced to endure the hot summer months within the walls of his stifling and
constricted abode.13 Concerned that his singularly unfilial and unfraternal rise––he
committed fratricide in addition to usurping the throne from his father––might
taint his image to posterity, Taizong courted favor from his ministers, theatrically
practicing Confucian virtue.14 Showing deference to Confucianism, the emperor
eagerly urged remonstration and adopted the role of a student before his ministers.15
He meticulously followed the Confucian precepts of frugality and moderation and
responded to scholarly advice fervently.16 These first few years exalted Taizong’s image
to that of an ideal Chinese emperor, but this was not to last.
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 othschild, “Rhetoric, Ritual, and Support Constituencies,” 147.
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Ibid.
Rothschild, “Rhetoric, Ritual, and Support Constituencies,” 150.
Howard J. Weschler, “The Founding of the T’ang Dynasty: Kao-Tsu (Reign 618–26),” The
Cambridge History of China, vol. 3, 186.
14 To cite an example of Taizong’s performative Confucian morality, Howard J. Weschler describes
an event that occurred in 628, when the emperor saw a swarm of locusts ravishing his city. In
response to the pestilent spectacle, Taizong journeyed to the Imperial Park, grabbed a fistful of the
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See Howard J. Weschler, “T’ai-Tsung the Consolidator (Reign 626-49),” The Cambridge History of
China, 190.
15 Howard J. Weschler, “T’ai-Tsung the Consolidator (Reign 626-49),” The Cambridge History of
China: Sui and T’ang China, 589-906 AD, Part One, ed. by John K. Fairbank and Denis Twitchett
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 190.
16 Weschler, “T’ai-Tsung the Consolidator,” 191.
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Towards the latter half of Taizong’s rule, his adolescent tendencies of ambitious,
self-aggrandizing expansion returned. The prosperity of the empire allotted Taizong
the confidence to convert his attention to military campaigns and provoke court
factionalism as a means to amplify his power.17 By 643, his success ebbed. As a result
of his failed manipulations of both court factions and his eldest son, Li Chengqian 李
承乾 (618-45), Taizong lost political face.18 To recoup prestige, he launched a series
of late-reign military campaigns. However, his martial (wu 武) focus only served to
increase the dissatisfaction of his ministers.
While Taizong achieved great success in terms of civil reforms and his early
military achievements, but he did so at the cost of splintering relations with his inner
court. Failed military campaigns like the disastrous Liaodong 遼東 campaign of 645
cast a shadow over his reign.19 After deliberately ignoring the advice of counsellors
during that fiasco, he continued developing plans to seize and destroy neighboring
North Korean kingdom, Koguryo (Gaogouli: 高句麗), which only resulted in
further futility.20
Stricken in 648 with a debilitating disease, Taizong grew more concerned about
passing the large if fragile empire to his heir and, therefore, composed Plan for an
Emperor.21 In this text, in an effort to summarize and pass on knowledge of rulership
to his ill-prepared fourth son Li Zhi 李治, the future Gaozong, Taizong removes
his crown, and speaks as a father directly to his son. Within his manual, Taizong
includes time-honored approaches to rulership and governance while discussing the
shortcomings and successes of his reign.22
Besides this eleventh hour paternal circumspection and humility, there is another
possible ulterior motive for his composition of Plan. In view of Taizong’s protracted
struggle to regain political prestige in the 640s, the work may present an extension of
his initial efforts to mend fissures within the court and to re-cast himself as a model
sovereign. Moreover, by adhering to and revering Chinese tradition in Plan, Taizong

17 A
 ndrew Eisenberg, “A Study in Court Factionalism: The Politics of Tang Taizong,” T’ang Studies
2002, no. 20-21(2013): 39.
18 Eisenberg, “A Study in Court Factionalism,” 53.
19 Weschler, “T’ai-tsung the Consolidator,” 239.
20 Ibid.
21 Twitchett, “How to be an Emperor,” 92.
22 Twitchett, “How to be an Emperor,” 92-93; Jack Chen, Poetics of Sovereignty: on Emperor Taizong
of the Tang Dynasty (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2010), 104.
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recognized the superior authority of convention over his ambition, effectively making
amends for his earlier hubris.
Both Taizong and Wu Zhao utilized tradition to legitimate their reigns. At
the beginning, and textually at the end of his reign, Taizong sought to burnish his
historical reputation by embodying Confucian virtue. Taizong used ideas passed
down by ancestors to create a time-proven guide for Gaozong, and in doing so
sought to leave an enduring positive image of himself to posterity; Wu Zhao did not.
Compared to Taizong, Wu Zhao’s aides crafted her signature text, Regulations, at the
ascendency of her career while she was Grand Dowager––a time of maturation and
cultivation of her political power. By weaving Confucian precepts into her text, she
upheld a superficial, culturally sanctioned moral standard. Yet, utilizing Confucian
ideas enabled Wu Zhao to breach Confucian gender roles and stretch the parameters
of her Confucian duties, once limited to the imperial family, and extend their
application to the country.
Wu Zhao was not merely a widow and a mother to the imperial family; she was
Sage Mother (Shengmu 聖母) to her court officials and the matriarchal head of the
empire.23 Featured in the fascicle of Regulations titled “Good Generals,” Wu Zhao
presented the actions of virtuous and sagacious past women such as Zifa’s mother
子發母 and Zhao Kuo’s mother 趙括母 (both widows of the late Warring States
era––third cent. BC––who were honored in the Confucian manual Biographies of
Exemplary Women 列女傳) to explicitly argue ‘mother knows best,’ thereby justifying
her stately duty as mother to her court ministers.24 Including these women in her
narrative echoed the Sage Mother’s intention to stretch the motherhood paradigm
to include both ministers and China as a whole.25 Facing the condemnatory gaze of
the Confucian patriarchy, Wu Zhao needed to bolster her legitimacy; she did this
by articulating a demanding and clear-cut set of behavioral expectations for court
ministers rather than, as Plan had, attempting to postulate a plan for ruling. In
summary, the onus was placed not upon the ruler (herself ), but on the ministers.

23 R
 othschild, Emperor Wu Zhao and her Pantheon, 32. “Sage Mother” was the title Wu Zhao
assumed in 688 that edged her closer to full acquisition of power under the title of Emperor.
24 Chen Gui 臣軌 [Regulations for Ministers], Zhongjing ji qita wuzhong 忠經及其他五種, Congshu
jicheng chubian 叢書集成初編 0893, ed. Wu Zetian 武則天, trans. N. Harry Rothschild (Taibei:
Shangwu, 1936), Chapter 9.
25 Rothschild, Emperor Wu Zhao and her Pantheon, 140.
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By expanding the motherhood paradigm through the inclusion of virtuous
mothers of the past, Wu Zhao obtained access to the public sphere. Each of these
celebrated mothers challenged the morality and the competence of their sons,
eminent generals. To sway their errant sons, these maternal figures upheld aspects
of Confucian virtue, urging their wayward offspring to practice remonstrance,
moderation, frugality, and moral uprightness. In doing so, they made themselves
enduring archetypes of moral virtue. Moreover, these maternal paragons implicitly
argued that they had a rightful role within the bureaucracy by superseding familial
devotions in favor of correcting the morality in their wayward sons in service of
the state.26 Another reason Wu Zhao incorporated these women into this signature
text was to artfully illustrate that she was a follower of Confucianism who revered
past exemplary women.27 Moreover, recognizing Confucian women who occupied
traditional female roles yet who wielded significant sway over their families, in theory,
helped soften criticism against Wu Zhao, who, as grand dowager-regent, already
wielded great authority.28
Sharing a Common Body
Although China failed to legally bar women from dynastic succession, conventions
prohibited them from becoming emperor.29 Despite the unspoken rule that excluded
women from the public sphere, as empress and empress dowager-regent, Wu Zhao
shed the traditionally passive role held by women in exchange for fulfilling a visible and
active role in politics. While her place as grand dowager-regent was not uncommon,
being recognized as sovereign was. Yet, in 690, Wu Zhao ruled as emperor.
Regulations’ utilization of the “common body” metaphor masked Wu Zhao’s
desire for power by mimicking tradition. Like Wu Zhao’s incorporation of women
into state ritual like the Feng and Shan to justify her political presence, her use of
the “common body” metaphor permitted her to breach the veil that concealed her
from officials, and visually conveyed her superior role within the government. In

26 N
 . Harry Rothschild, “Beyond Filial Piety: Biographies of Exemplary Women and Wu Zhao’s New
Paradigm of Political Authority,” T’ang Studies 2005 no. 23-24 (2013): 162.
27 Rothschild, “Beyond Filial Piety,” 162.
28 Ibid.
29 Lien-Sheng Yang, “Female Rulers in Imperial China,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 23, no.
1960-1961 (1960): 50. doi:10.2307/2718567.
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this opening fascicle of Regulations, the clever grand dowager-regent held that “the
relationship between ministers and the ruler is like that of the four limbs bearing the
eminent head…the ruler is the eminent head. The minister is the legs and arms. The
above and below are mutually dependent and become a single body.”30 By weaving
the metaphor of the “common body” into the text, the ruler and ministers belonged
to the same body, thus, effectively blurring Wu Zhao’s conspicuous feminine form.
Over 800 years before Wu Zhao acquired the crown, Empress Lü 呂后 (d.
180 BC) of the Western Han 西漢 (206 BC-8 AD) utilized her position as grand
dowager-regent to wield power. Confucian historians of subsequent eras cast her
reign as a perversion of cosmic and human nature, a deformity on the patriarchal
order that should be prevented from recurring.31 In seventh century China, there
was no precedent for a woman to occupy the throne; given the ill-remembered
reign of Empress Lü, Wu Zhao’s intention to seize paramount power required her to
navigate an unorthodox route, countering court officials who opposed her bid for
power.32 So, to supersede the “old guard’s” resistance, she harnessed her yin essence
through the manipulation of her title “grand dowager.” Traditionally, a widow acted
as the matriarchal head who, in the absence of a strong competent male heir, might
act as the head of the family, charged with maintaining and controlling her late
husband’s estate.33 For Wu Zhao that “estate” was all of China. Wu Zhao relied on
her power as empress dowager-regent and the manipulation of Confucian ideas––the
“common body”––to discreetly succeed the throne, while distancing her reign––
although unsuccessfully––from the memory of the disreputable Empress Lü. Wu
Zhao made the state, the empire, her extended family. Hence her position as grand
dowager-regent justified her role as the head and the mind-heart of the larger body
politic, the metaphorical “common body.”
Although Taizong’s approach to governance in the latter half of his rule became
more autocratic as he distanced himself from ministers and court, his valedictory
work, Plan, conveyed a different ideal. Summoning up his early collaborative rapport
with his officials, Taizong described an interdependent bond between minister
and ruler, a link also reflected in Wu Zhao’s manual, Regulations. Plan stated, “in
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Chen Gui, Chapter 1.
 ang, “Female Rulers in Imperial China,” 51.
Y
Lewis, China’s Cosmopolitan Empire, 38.
Rothschild, Emperor Wu Zhao and Her Pantheon, 127.
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establishing the state and controlling the people, [officials] provide the ruler’s arms
and legs, by means of which he brings together his strength.”34 This excerpt reflects
a mutual dependency between sovereign and his ministers. This espoused desire to
establish a cooperative bond between ruler and ministers stood in stark contrast to
the hubris that characterized Taizong’s later years as emperor, distancing him from the
paradigm of an ideal sovereign he sought to embody.
Both Wu Zhao and Taizong drew upon the notion of the body politic from
earlier Confucian texts. Confucian scholar Mencius 孟子 (372-289 BC) expounded
a similar concept of the minister-ruler relationship, claiming that, “if the ruler views
the ministers like the hands and feet, then the ministers view their ruler like their
stomach and heart/mind.”35 However, unlike the two emperors, the celebrated
scholar-philosopher of the Warring States era instituted the idea as a general ideal
of governance. In contrast, Taizong and Wu Zhao included the “common body” in
their respective guides as part of an effort to communicate their respective political
messages. For Wu Zhao, the metaphor acted as countermeasure to displace the
unprecedented nature of a female occupying the throne. For Taizong, the “common
body” metaphor stressed the importance for an interconnected relationship built
on the organic adhesive––kinship ties––to, as Jack Chen states, “transform the
impersonal teachings of government into the flesh and blood bonds of family.”36
Reflective of precedent, in Regulations, Wu Zhao compared the body metaphor
to constructing a building or structure; thus, perpetuating the idea of a symbiotic
relationship between ruler and ministers. The text includes the passage: “if a ruler
desires to build a great edifice, he must avail himself of the raw materials of the
multitudes––columns, pillars, ridge posts and rafters…if not for the raw material
of the body, the entire structure could not be completed.”37 In the fourth section
of Plan, Taizong illustrated a similar point that translated into selecting ministers.
His manual stated, “the enlightened ruler’s employment of men is like the skilled
carpenter’s cutting timber: he makes a cart’s shafts out of the straight timber and the
wheels from the curved pieces; he uses the long timbers for rafters and ridgepoles

34 T
 witchett, “How to be an Emperor,” 68.
35 Tao Liang and Ian M. Sullivan, “Political Thought in Early Confucianism,” Frontiers of Philosophy
in China 5, no. 2 (2010): 229.
36 Chen, Poetics of Sovereignty, 97.
37 Chen Gui, Chapter 1.
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and the short pieces for roof brackets and eaves-rafters.”38 Although similar, both
construction metaphors facilitated each emperor’s independent aim. For Taizong, the
metaphor reminded his heir apparent to search for worthy officials and to employ
them where their talent was best utilized. For Wu Zhao, the building analogy
reinforced her interconnected relationship with minsters––a bond that glossed over
her gender. Both interpretations of the construction analogy agreed that a ruler was
the master builder, capable of piecing together fragments––ministers––to bring into
realization the effective governance of the state.39
Filial Piety and Absolute Loyalty
To further bond ministers to her sovereign body, Wu Zhao had to rely on something
greater than metaphor. As grand dowager-regent and later as sovereign she needed
a belief as adhesive and culturally potent as filial piety within a family. So, within
Regulations she rhetorically blurred the distinctions between the twin Confucian
pillars––filial piety (xiao 孝), the alpha virtue cohering the corporate family, and
loyalty (zhong 忠), the paramount virtue upon which the sanctity and stability of
state was built––to fashion a greater bond, one encompassing both family and state,
which bound ministers to their ruler.
Wu Zhao’s lowborn roots led her to challenge the structure of society. Her
co-rule with Gaozong, regency, and reign spurred a vital shift within social classes.
She directly attacked the “old officials” and upended the aristocracy and, with
it, the fubing system 府兵制 (personal militia)––the influential families’ prop.40
Therefore, to seize the throne and quash the elite’s authority, Wu Zhao co-opted
the twin pillars of Confucianism, urging for filial relations to exist beholden to
the state, not the family. Family was a bond that challenged her supreme position
in the kingdom.41 Hence the issue was with blood-ties, not the concept of filial
piety itself. Regulations held that “the ruler is the root of the parents. Without the
ruler, the parents would not exist. The nation is the foundation of the household.

38 T
 witchett, “How to Be an Emperor,” 66.
39 Denis Twitchett, “Chen Gui and Other Works Attributed to Empress Wu Zeitan,” Asia Major 16,
no. 1 (2003): 73.
40 Ibid.
41 Rothschild, Emperor Wu Zhao and her Pantheon, 142.
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Without the nation, the family could not exist.”42 She developed this idea further,
deeming kinship ties the “lesser loyalty” compared to the greater loyalty owed to the
ruler.43 The same notion is projected in “Good Generals,” where Zifa’s mother and
the mothers of other generals consistently urged their sons to place the interest and
well-being of the state above private concerns and familial obligations.
Traditionally, family constituted the primary unit of Chinese society.44 However,
Wu Zhao challenged this notion stating, “although the bond between father and son
are extremely close, they are not like ruler and minister…There have been fathers
without sons. There have been families without fathers. Yet there has never been
a ruler without ministers…therefore it can be said that these relationships are not
the same.”45 In short, this notion is an extension of the “common body”: fathers
and sons are separate beings, both can exist separately and function independently,
yet, rulers and ministers are one being, each inseparable and interdependent on the
other’s function. This passage articulates the crux of her novel ideology, a twist on
Confucianism that intimated the ruler and the state superseded the family. Thus,
Regulations demoted the domestic sphere, and proposed that the state was the
foundation of families.46
Wu Zhao expanded the compass and authority of her title “grand dowager-regent”
to strip two emperors regnant––her sons Zhongzong 中宗 (r. 684 and 705-10) and
Ruizong 睿宗(r. 684-690, 710-12)—of authority and to assert her supreme position
in government, as mother of the state, with an unbreakable bond to her “sons” in the
court. To explain her stance, Wu Zhao, in Regulations, first articulated filial duties
stating that if one “sees the father or mother in bodily discomfort, then he himself
cannot sleep: when one sees his father and mother without a full belly, then he himself
cannot eat.”47 A few lines later, the treatment of parents is elided with a minister’s duty
to a ruler to confuse Confucianism’s alpha virtues of filial piety and loyalty, proposing
that they are nearly one and the same. “When a man serves the ruler,” Regulations
states, “he does not concern himself with whether the task is difficult or easy. There

42
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Chen Gui, Chapter 2.
Ibid.
Twitchett, “Chen Gui and Other Works,” 75.
Chen Gui, Chapter 1.
Rothschild, “Beyond Filial Piety,” 164.
Chen Gui, Chapter 2.
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is nothing he will shirk. He will not be remiss. There is no task he will avoid.”48
This excerpt from Regulations framed the expectation that, like a dutiful son to his
family, a minister fulfils his filial duties to his surrogate political mother, Wu Zhao.
By presenting these ideas, Wu Zhao skirted typical social relationships. Ministers
no longer served their own families but became the Sage Mother’s political sons and
owed her their filial devotions.49
To smoothly issue her dogmatic beliefs that sought to demote ministerial prestige
and the prominence of the great clans, Wu Zhao dissected filial demands. Reducing
the family in favor of the state marked a critical strategy to diminish the authority
of officials and shift the center of power to herself. Most chief ministers came from
prestigious families, a birthright that excluded Wu Zhao.50 Besides rhetorically
re-mastering pivotal concepts of governance, her textual contributions elevated her
status by devaluing filial relations amongst ministers and their families and exalting
the loyalty of a court official to the ruler. Filial needs pertained to the domestic
sphere and, therefore, conflicted with the demands of a ruler; thus, Regulations
mandates that the minister, “adopt the public sphere and cast aside the private.”51
To embed this notion, she ingeniously infused her ideology into the character for
ministers. Just prior to the inauguration of her Zhou dynasty 周 (r. 690-705) and
her accession to emperor, Wu Zhao created new characters: the combination of
the characters, zhong 忠, “loyal,” under a pie or yi 一, “one” replaced the former
character for minister or subject, (chen 臣).52 To be an official for Wu Zhao meant
having a single-minded loyalty.
Conclusion
Wu Zhao established that tradition was a malleable concept, one that in the hands of
a capable ruler with a grasp of language and rhetoric might be custom-shaped to suit
distinctive political demands. She toed the line of tradition, pulling from established
ideas expressed since antiquity. Although drawing on time-honored principles from

48 I bid.
49 Rothschild, “Beyond Filial Piety,” 150.
50 Richard Guisso, Wu Tse-T’ien and the Politics of Legitimation in T’ang China (Bellingham: East
Asian Studies Press, 1978), 27, https://cedar.wwu.edu/easpress/29.
51 Chen Gui, Chapter 2.
52 Twitchett, “Chen Gui and Other Works,” 73.
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Confucian sages like Mencius and borrowing elements from Taizong’s Plan, such
as the “common body,” structural analogies, and passages that criticized flattery,
her work was original. The purpose, audience, and timing behind the creation of
the individual works marks a clear divergence between Plan for an Emperor and
Regulations for Ministers.
Regulations tore away from precedent as a result of Wu Zhao’s personal desire to
overcome gender constraints, refute charges of illegitimacy or usurpation of power,
and offset resistance from the “old officials.” To facilitate this, Regulations––published
five years before the beginning of her reign––aimed solely at suppressing the
authority of ministers by organically binding them to her sovereign body via absolute
loyalty. While the text already contained undercurrents reflecting the malleability of
Confucian culture, her elevation of Regulations to canonical status in 693 represented
the ultimate display of the pliability of tradition.53 Unlike other canonical texts that
excluded women from the public sphere, Regulations justified and condoned the
political involvement of Wu Zhao, a woman. She was the heart/mind of the “common
body,” the quintessential element aiding the function of the greater body politic.
In contrast, Taizong composed Plan setting forth conventional ideas on rulership
as a blueprint for his ill-prepared successor, Gaozong, to emulate. By providing a
work that aimed at being and becoming an upright ruler, Taizong sought to, once
again, gain the favor of his Confucian ministers and to frame his reign in a more
positive historical light. Due to these significant differences, Wu Zhao’s work stands
independent from Plan. She may have pulled from similar ideas, but ultimately her
signature text, Regulations, morphed and stretched traditional beliefs and concepts
until they mutated into a convention that was all her own.

53 Rothschild, Emperor Wu Zhao and her Pantheon, 127.
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